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Richard Kueng∗ Dustin G. Mixon† Soledad Villar‡
Abstract
Gerrymandering is a long-standing issue within the U.S. political system, and it has received
scrutiny recently by the U.S. Supreme Court. In this note, we prove that deciding whether there
exists a fair redistricting among legal maps is NP-hard. To make this precise, we use simplified
notions of “legal” and “fair” that account for desirable traits such as geographic compactness of
districts and sufficient representation of voters. The proof of our result is inspired by the work
of Mahanjan, Minbhorkar and Varadarajan that proves that planar k-means is NP-hard.
1 Introduction
Gerrymandering is the manipulation of district boundaries in order to favor a party or class. It has
been an issue in the U.S. political system for centuries. Over this period, several legal constraints,
such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, have been installed in order to avoid certain forms of
gerrymandering. Even so, map makers with an agenda can optimize their objective (e.g., maximize
the number of seats for a certain party) subject to these legal constraints. Today, gerrymandered
maps are continually brought to court, where they are struck down as illegal under federal or state
law with some regularity.
In the recent Supreme Court case Gill v. Whitford, it was argued that the Wisconsin State
Assembly map exhibits partisan gerrymandering. The plaintiffs offered evidence based on the
efficiency gap metric [22, 4] and partisan bias metrics [10, 13]. The Supreme Court did not rule
on whether these metrics must be part of a test for partisan gerrymandering, thereby leaving
open a fundamental question: What is an appropriate metric to detect partisan gerrymandering?
The answer to this question will undoubtedly require a robust theoretical framework for analyzing
gerrymandering, and fortunately, gerrymandering is currently an active research area.
Implicit in the notion of gerrymandering is the notion of a fair map, which is subjective, and
therefore hard to define. One interesting approach along these lines is to consider a probability
distribution on all legal maps, and then say that a map is fair if it is a typical instance of such
a distribution [3, 8]. In order to decide whether a map is typical, researchers consider relevant
observables of the distribution and determine whether they land within typical values [14, 15, 5].
Observables of interest include the proportion of seats to votes and the difference between the mean
and median votes in different districts.
One pitfall of such an approach is that the set of legal maps appears to be computationally
intractable. For instance, in order to compute the set of legal maps that improve on the existing
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plan (Act 43, drawn in 2011) for the Wisconsin State Assembly, one must find all possible ways to
assign 6895 precincts to 99 districts so that each of the following conditions hold simultaneously [11]:
• all districts have equal population,
• at most 58 counties can be split in different districts,
• at most 62 municipalities can be split,
• the average Reock score1 is at least 0.39,
• the average Polsby–Popper score2 is at least 0.28,
• at least 6 districts satisfy that at least 40% of their citizens of voting age are black, and
• districts 8 and 9 do not change (previously ordered by a federal court).
In order to work around this apparent intractability, Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations
have been developed to generate a random ensemble of representative maps, which are then used to
estimate the distribution of relevant observables [3, 8, 6]. Recent work [5] provides local statistical
tests based on Markov Chains to prove that certain maps are unfair (given that they are outliers)
with no need to provide a definition nor characterization of fair redistricting.
In this work, we prove that computational intractability is inherent to the redistricting problem.
In particular, we show that even for simple definitions of “fair” and “legal,” deciding whether there
exists a fair redistricting among legal maps is NP-hard. While this result is mostly relevant from
a theoretical point of view (i.e., worst-case complexity says very little about real-world maps), it
should help researchers gauge what sort of performance guarantees are provable with their redis-
tricting algorithms. In words, our definition of fair requires that a party of interest receives at least
some prescribed level of representation, while our definition of legal only requires that
• all districts have approximately the same population, and
• all districts satisfy a mild notion of geographic compactness.
While our fairness criterion is not currently a legal standard, it has been used in court to argue that
a given map is the result of a partisan gerrymander (for instance, in terms of efficiency gap). Our
result identifies a fundamental tension between judging a partisan gerrymander by the shape of
voting districts (i.e., violating some notion of geographic compactness) and judging it by the impact
of the gerrymander (i.e., violating a desired level of proportionality or efficiency gap); see [1, 2] for
additional results along these lines.
2 Main result
Throughout, we denote [n] := {1, . . . , n}. The goal of redistricting is to partition a state into
districts that satisfy various criteria. Let D1 unionsq · · · unionsq Dk = R2 denote a partition of the plane into
k districts. Suppose there are n voters labeled by members of [n], and suppose loc : [n] → Q2
reports the location of each voter. Then the voters that reside in district Di make up the set
Di := loc
−1(Di) ⊆ [n]. Intuitively, we want each Di to have about the same size, since this will
ensure that voters from different districts receive equal representation:
1The Reock score [20] is the ratio of the area of the district to the area of the smallest circle containing the district.
2The Polsby–Popper score [19] is 4pi times the area of the district divided by the square of its perimeter.
2
(F1) (1− γ)nk ≤ |Dl| ≤ (1 + γ)nk for every l ∈ [k].
(Here, γ ∈ (0, 1) is a rational number that is chosen to be appropriately small.) Assuming equal
voter turnout, then this is equivalent to one person, one vote, which requires that districts
contain roughly equal size populations. A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s ruled
that one person, one vote must hold for all levels of redistricting [21].
Next, we consider geographic compactness, which is a geometric requirement on the shape
of the districts Di. Indeed, gerrymandering is historically detected by districts exhibiting bizarre
shape (even the etymology of “gerrymander” comes from likening the shape of a Massachusetts
voting district to the profile of a salamander [12]). To enforce geographic compactness, one may
force all of the districts to have a large Reock score [20] or Polsby–Popper score [19]. Another
popular score is the convex hull score, which is the ratio |D |/| hull(D)| of the area of a given
district D to the area of its convex hull [18]. Of course, a district receives the maximum possible
convex hull score (i.e., 1) precisely when it is convex. Notice that a partition D1 unionsq · · · unionsqDk = [n]
can be realized from convex districts in the plane if and only if
(F2) hull({loc(i)}i∈Dl) ∩ hull({loc(i)}i∈Dl′ ) = ∅ for every l, l′ ∈ [k] with l 6= l′.
Note that (F2) can be checked in polynomial time by linear programming. While the convex hull
score is mathematically convenient to work with, it can lead to undesirable districts. For example,
if we partition a state into k horizontal strips, then we achieve the best possible convex hull scores
for each district, and yet every district will contain voters from the far-east and west sides of the
state. This lack of compactness would be indicated by a large Reock score or Polsby–Popper score.
Alternatively, we can enforce a bound on the distance between any two voters in a given district:
(F3) ‖loc(i)− loc(j)‖2 ≤ d whenever i, j ∈ Dl for some l ∈ [k].
Here, d > 0 is a rational number.
Amazingly, it is possible to concoct an extremely partisan gerrymander, even when constrained
to geographically compact districts that satisfy one person, one vote. For example, Figure 1 in [2]
illustrates two different partitions of Wisconsin into eight equally populated districts that use
straight line segment boundaries; the first partition makes all eight districts majority-Republican,
whereas the second makes all but one district majority-Democrat (this is the most possible since
Wisconsin is majority-Republican). To defeat partisan gerrymandering in court, one might compare
voter preferences to election outcomes. Indeed, if the proportion of seats won by a party in a state
is significantly different from the proportion of votes cast for that party in that state, then one
might blame partisan gerrymandering for the discrepancy. Along these lines, arguments in the
U.S. Supreme Court have leveraged the notion of proportionality (in Davis v. Bandemer) and of
efficiency gap (in Gill v. Whitford).
In our formulation, we let pref : [n]→ {0, 1} denote the function that reports the preference of
each voter. In practice, this function can be estimated with the help of past election data. Then
for some integer m > 0, one can ask for the following:
(F4) the number of l ∈ [k] such that |Dl ∩ pref−1(1)| > 12 |Dl| is at least m.
As an extreme example, if half of the voters have preference 1 and k is large, then it is reasonable
to ask for at least m = 1 of the districts to be majority-1. (We note that the lack of symmetry
between preference 1 and preference 0 in (F4) will not be important to our formulation; for example,
one may replace 1 with 0 in (F4) in order to ensure that preference-0 voters also receive sufficient
representation.)
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x4
←−“variable vertex”
x1
“clause vertex”
(¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x4)
↗
(¬x2 ∨ ¬x4 ∨ ¬x3)
↖
x3
Figure 1: A planar 3-SAT instance is a special type of 3-SAT instance that corresponds to a planar
graph. The graph has one “variable vertex” per variable, and one “clause vertex” per clause, and
two vertices share an edge precisely when one vertex is a variable vertex assigned to variable xj , the
other is a clause vertex assigned to clause ct, and either xj or ¬xj appear in ct. Here, we illustrate
a planar embedding of the planar 3-SAT instance (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x4) ∧ (¬x2 ∨ ¬x4 ∨ ¬x3).
Definition 1.
(a) Given γ ∈ (0, 1) and d > 0, we say a partition D1 unionsq · · · unionsq Dk = [n] is (γ, d)-legal for
loc : [n]→ Q2 if it satisfies (F1)–(F3).
(b) Given m > 0, we say a partition D1 unionsq · · · unionsq Dk = [n] is m-fair for pref : [n] → {0, 1} if it
satisfies (F4).
(c) For each γ ∈ (0, 1) and d > 0, the (γ, d)-legal redistricting decision problem takes as
input (n, k, loc) and returns whether there exists a partition D1 unionsq · · · unionsq Dk = [n] that is
(γ, d)-legal for loc.
(d) For each γ ∈ (0, 1) and d > 0, the fair (γ, d)-legal redistricting decision problem takes
as input (n, k, loc,m, pref) and returns whether there exists a partition D1 unionsq · · · unionsq Dk = [n]
that is both (γ, d)-legal for loc and m-fair for pref.
In words, (γ, d)-legal redistricting asks whether there exists a legal map (satisfying (F1)–(F3)),
whereas fair (γ, d)-legal redistricting asks whether there exists a fair map (satisfying (F4)) among
legal maps. Note that (γ, d)-legal redistricting amounts to a planar clustering problem that is likely
NP-hard (given its resemblance to problems in [17, 23]), but this will not play a role in our result.
What follows is our main result:
Theorem 2. For every rational γ ∈ (0, 1) and d > 0, fair (γ, d)-legal redistricting is NP-complete.
Furthermore, there exists a promise of instances over which fair (γ, d)-legal redistricting remains
NP-hard even though the corresponding instances of (γ, d)-legal redistricting can be decided in poly-
nomial time.
In words, it is sometimes hard to find a legal redistricting that is fair, even when it is easy to find
a legal redistricting. Our proof follows by reduction from planar 3-SAT, taking inspiration from
Mahanjan, Minbhorkar and Varadarajan’s proof that planar k-means is NP-hard [16]. Interestingly,
our reduction takes |pref−1(1)| > 1−γ2 n and m = o(k), meaning that in the worst case, it is hard to
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“clause-adjacent towns”
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Figure 2: Our reduction converts any planar 3-SAT instance into an instance of fair (γ, d)-legal
redistricting. The 3-SAT instance in this example is (¬x1∨x2∨¬x4)∧(¬x2∨¬x4∨¬x3). The districts
correspond to the solution (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (0, 0, 0, 1) to the original planar 3-SAT instance. Notice
that the number of edge towns between the two clauses that correspond to the variable x2 (x4) is
odd (even) because the variable appears with opposite (equal) sign in these clauses.
decide whether there exists a redistricting satisfying (F1)–(F3) that ensures that preference-1 voters
win at least a vanishing fraction of the districts, even if they make up nearly half of the popular
vote. In what follows, we first describe the reduction, then we prove that the resulting instance of
fair redistricting is satisfiable if and only if the original planar 3-SAT instance is satisfiable, and
finally, we describe the technical details of how the reduction can be performed in polynomial time.
Given any instance of planar 3-SAT (illustrated in Figure 1), we prescribe a corresponding
instance of fair (γ, d)-legal redistricting (illustrated in Figure 2). We are given a planar bipartite
graph of clause vertices and variable vertices, where each clause vertex has degree 3. Construct
a planar embedding of this graph with integer vertex coordinates. At each clause vertex, locally
deform the incident edges so that they approach the clause vertex at 0, 2pi3 and
4pi
3 radians. Next, we
place “towns” at various points in the plane relative to this graph embedding before placing voters
at each town. Pick η > 0 and  > 0 to be sufficiently small rational numbers (we will have  η,
and both will be polynomially small in the number of vertices). Place a “big clause town” at each
clause vertex and a “small clause town”  away at 0 radians. About each clause vertex, place six
“clause-adjacent towns” at distances between 0.99η and η away and at angles approximately equal
to 2pij18 for j ∈ {1, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17}. For each variable vertex x, consider the set Cx ⊆ R2 of points
that are between η and 32η away from the edges incident to x. Place “edge towns” throughout Cx
so that (1) each edge town has exactly two towns that are between 0.99η and η away (one of which
might be clause-adjacent) and none closer, and (2) the number of edge towns between consecutive
clause-adjacent towns is even (odd) when the signs of x in these clauses are equal (opposite).
As we verify later, all of these town locations can be selected to have coordinates with a loga-
rithmically small number of digits of precision. Before placing voters at the various towns, we first
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multiply all of the towns’ coordinates by the rational number d/(η + ). After this multiplication,
the description lengths of these coordinates with remain logarithmically small. For simplicity of
exposition, we assume d = η +  without loss of generality so that no multiplication is necessary.
We now place voters at the various towns. Take L > 1/γ2 to be a multiple of 4. Each big and
small clause town receives L and b2γ3 Lc voters, respectively, all of which have preference 1. Each
clause-adjacent town receives L2 + bγ6Lc voters, L4 with preference 1 and L4 + bγ6Lc with preference
0. In each edge town, we place L2 voters,
L
4 −bγ4Lc with preference 1 and L4 + bγ4Lc with preference
0. Take k to be the number of clauses plus half the number of non-clause towns, and set m to be
twice the number of clauses.
Lemma 3. Given any instance of planar 3-SAT, the corresponding instance of fair (γ, d)-legal
redistricting is satisfiable if and only if the original instance of planar 3-SAT is satisfiable.
Proof. In order to satisfy (F2), all voters in a given town belong to the same district. Next, (F1) and
(F3) together force every edge town to be matched with one of the two towns that are approximately
η away. Each clause-adjacent town is either matched with the edge town approximately η away, or
the nearest clause-adjacent town. In the latter case, the corresponding small clause town may also
join the district, but it may not join any other clause-adjacent town in order to maintain (F3). The
big clause towns may be matched with the corresponding small clause town when it is not matched
with clause-adjacent towns; otherwise, these big clause towns are so big that they form their own
districts in order to satisfy (F1).
Overall, for each variable x, the corresponding edge towns and clause-adjacent towns are per-
fectly matched in one of two ways (namely, one of two perfect matchings in an even cyclic graph).
For a clause that includes x (the negation of x), we may interpret the corresponding clause-adjacent
towns as sharing a district precisely when x is true (false). As such, the underlying instance of
planar 3-SAT is satisfiable precisely when there exist districts satisfying (F1)–(F3) such that, for
every clause, there exists a corresponding pair of clause-adjacent towns that share a district (in
which case, the small clause town may join their district).
The majority-1 districts are precisely the ones that contain a big or small clause town, and so
there are at most m such districts. Equality occurs, namely (F4), precisely when each of the small
clause towns is matched with some pair of clause-adjacent towns, which is feasible precisely when
the underlying instance of planar 3-SAT is satisfiable.
Next, we quickly verify that given any instance of planar 3-SAT, the corresponding instance
of (γ, d)-legal redistricting can be solved in polynomial time. (Then the promise of instances in
Theorem 2 can be taken to be the image of our reduction from planar 3-SAT.) First, assign each
town that contains L voters to its own district, and then add as many voters to these districts as
possible while satisfying (F1) and (F3). After doing so, there will be m/2 districts, each containing
a big clause town and the corresponding small clause town. Next, define a graph such that the
vertices are the remaining towns, with two towns being adjacent if their distance is at most η.
This graph is a disjoint union of cycles, and one may partition the remaining towns into districts
by selecting any perfect matching of towns. The result is a (γ, d)-legal redistricting that can be
computed in polynomial time.
To prove Theorem 2, it remains to show that our reduction from planar 3-SAT can be accom-
plished in polynomial time. To this end, there are three nontrivial subroutines to analyze:
(i) Given an instance of planar 3-SAT, find a corresponding planar embedding.
(ii) Given a planar 3-SAT embedding, locally deform the edges incident to each clause vertex.
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Figure 3: Deformation of the Chrobrak–Payne embedding of a planar 3-SAT instance in an ∞-
norm ball centered at a clause vertex with radius δ1. In each case, the clause vertex has three edges
(dotted) that are redirected along the boundary of the ∞-norm balls of radius δ13 and/or 2δ13 .
(iii) Place towns throughout the plane with the appropriate geometry and parity.
For (i), we appeal to the following:
Proposition 4 (Chrobrak–Payne [7]). There exists a linear-time algorithm that, given an N -vertex
planar graph as input, outputs a planar embedding of that graph such that
(a) the embedded vertices lie in a 2N × 2N integer grid, and
(b) the embedded edges are line segments.
We will exploit the form of this embedding in our analysis of (ii) and (iii). To accomplish (ii),
we first identify a suitably small neighborhood of each clause vertex v, specifically, the set of points
B(v, δ1) in the plane that are within some δ1 > 0 of v in∞-norm. Provided δ1 is small enough, then
the portion of the Chrobrak–Payne embedding that resides in B(v, δ1) amounts to three segments
emanating from v, and the angle between any two of these segments is at least δ2 radians (for some
appropriately small δ2 > 0).
For simplicity, we may assume that the angles of these segments are at least δ2 away from
T := {0, 2pi3 , 4pi3 } ∪ {pi8 , 3pi8 , 5pi8 , 7pi8 }; indeed, if this fails to hold, we can redefine δ2 ← δ2/4, and
if there is still a segment of angle θ within δ2 of T , then we can modify that segment to be a
polygonal curve so that the portion in B(v, δ1/2) is a segment with angle θ+ 2δ2, and then redefine
δ1 ← δ1/2. Since the angles avoid {0, 2pi3 , 4pi3 }, they each reside in one of three sections: (0, 2pi3 ),
(2pi3 ,
4pi
3 ), (
4pi
3 , 2pi). As such, there are three cases to consider: (1) each angle resides in a different
section, (2) one section contains exactly two angles, and (3) one section contains all three angles.
By rotating and reflecting as necessary, one can ensure that (0, 2pi3 ) receives at least as many angles
as (4pi3 , 2pi), which receives at least as many angles as (
2pi
3 ,
4pi
3 ).
With this standardized form, Figure 3 illustrates how to modify the segments into polygonal
curves in each case so that the portions in B(v, δ1/3) are segments with angles {0, 2pi3 , 4pi3 }. Since
the original segment angles were at least δ2 from T , the segments of the new polygonal curves are
not too small. In particular, this modification to the Chrobrak–Payne embedding has the property
that each edge is embedded as a polygonal curve of segments such that
(D1) every segment has length at least δ := 1100 min{δ1, δ2}, and
(D2) every pair of disjoint segments in the graph embedding has distance at least δ.
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Importantly, δ1 and δ2 (and therefore δ) are polynomially small, which follows from Proposition 4
and the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Let A, B and C be distinct points in an `× ` integer grid. Then
(a) either sin(∠ABC) = 0 or sin(∠ABC) ≥ 1
2`2
, and
(b) either dist(A,BC) = 0 or dist(A,BC) ≥ 1
2`2
.
Proof. Put A,B,C ∈ [`]2 and denote (a, b) = A−B, (c, d) = C −B. Then
|det( a bc d )| = ‖(a, b)‖2 · ‖(c, d)‖2 · sin(∠ABC).
Assuming sin(∠ABC) 6= 0, then by integrality, the left-hand side is at least 1, whereas the right-
hand side is at most 2`2 sin(∠ABC). Rearranging then gives (a).
For (b), let D denote the closest point in BC to A. If D = A, then the distance is zero. If
D = B or C, then the distance is at least 1 since in this case, A and D are distinct points in an
integer grid. Otherwise, D 6= A is an interior point of BC, and by the Hilbert projection theorem,
∠ADB is a right angle. Since A and B are distinct, we have dist(A,B) ≥ 1, and so
dist(A,BC) = dist(A,D) ≥ dist(A,D)
dist(A,B)
= sin(∠ABD) = sin(∠ABC) ≥ 1
2`2
,
where the last step is by (a). This gives (b).
Finally, we analyze (iii). Let N denote the number of vertices in the original planar 3-SAT in-
stance, compute an embedding of the corresponding planar graph in a 2N×2N grid (this is possible
by Propostion 4), and locally deform the edges incident to each clause vertex so as to satisfy (D1)
and (D2) with δ = 1/(104N2) (this is possible by Lemma 5). For each of the (polynomially many)
segments of this new embedding, store the coordinates of each endpoint with p := d2 log10Ne+ 10
digits of precision.
We now describe where to place the various towns in our instance of fair redistricting. Select
η ∈ (0, δ/200) and  ∈ (0, η/200), each with p digits of precision. It is helpful to define a sequence
{zj}j∈[t] of t = 1800 points; take zj to have coordinates (η cos(2pij/t), η sin(2pij/t)), but rounded
to p + 20 digits of precision so as to have norm between 0.99η and η. Now for each clause vertex
v ∈ Z2, place a big clause town at v, a small clause town at v + (, 0), and place clause-adjacent
towns at v+zj for j ∈ {100, 500, 700, 1100, 1300, 1700}. Next, we will define edge town locations by
iteratively adding different choices of zj to existing town locations; see Figure 4 for an illustration.
Recall that for each variable vertex x, Cx denotes the set of points that are between η and
3
2η
away from the edges incident to x. Let Sx denote the subset obtained by removing any points from
Cx whose nearest point in the edges incident to x is within 1.35η of a clause vertex. In words, Sx is
a “broken” version of Cx; while Cx is connected, the number of connected components of Sx equals
the number of clause vertices adjacent to x in the original graph. Furthermore, since
1.35 < cos pi9 +
√
1− (54 − sin pi9 )2,
then for each clause-adjacent vertex u associated with an edge e incident to x, there exists j ∈ [t]
such that u+zt lies in Sx and has distance about
5
4η from e, and we place an edge town at u+zt ∈ Sx.
To clarify, each component of Sx can be thought of as an
η
4 -thickened curve, and we currently have
edge towns at both ends of this curve (modulo precision). Furthermore, it is straightforward to
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Figure 4: Detailed illustration of towns near a clause vertex. At this scale, edges incident to the
clause vertex amount to segments at angles 0, 2pi3 and
4pi
3 . Let x denote the variable vertex (not
depicted) that is incident to the edge at angle 0. Big and small clause towns are plotted in magenta
and violet, whereas clause-adjacent towns are distributed about the big clause town in green. Two
different components of Sx are found on both sides of an edge at distance η away. Edge towns
(depicted in blue) are placed inside each of these components.
show that every pair of edge towns currently has distance greater than 1.08η > η + . It remains
to place edge towns throughout the remainder of each component.
Fix a component of some Sx, and let w and w
′ denote the locations of the two edge towns that
have been placed in this component. Put w0 = w, and given wi, find j such that wi + zj ∈ Sx is
more than η+  away from all towns other than wi while being as close as possible to
5
4η away from
the edge set of the embedded graph, and put an edge town at wi+1 = wi + zj . (This computation
is feasible since the embedded graph is comprised of polynomially many segments, and there are
always polynomially many towns.) We terminate this iteration once wi satisfies ‖wi−w′‖2 ≤ 100η
and i has the appropriate parity (after this iteration, we will add an odd number of edge towns to
this component of Sx).
At this point, η < δ/200 and (D1) together imply that the portion of Sx between wi and w
′
corresponds to a straight line segment of the edge set of the graph embedding. For simplicity
of exposition, we will assume wi = (0, 0) and that w
′ = (x′, 0) lies on the positive x-axis, with
the understanding that we may rotate and translate as necessary before rounding to p+ 20 digits
of precision. With this orientation, we have [0, x′] × [−η5 , η5 ] ⊆ Sx. Taking r := bx′/1.95c, one
may use the fact that x′ ≥ 98η to verify that q := x′/r ∈ [1.95η, 1.99η]. Then we place an edge
town at (jq, 0) for every j ∈ [r − 1] and at ((j − 12)q,
√
(0.995η)2 − (q/2)2) for every j ∈ [r] (the
second coordinate lies in [0, η5 ] since q ∈ [1.95η, 1.99η]). Overall, for each component of each Sx, we
have identified locations for edge towns in polynomial time, completing the construction of a fair
(γ, d)-legal redistricting instance.
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